Abstract Let p be a prime and let E be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field F p of p elements. For a point G ∈ E(F p ) the elliptic curve congruential generator (with respect to the first coordinate) is a sequence (x n ) defined by the relation
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Introduction
For a prime p, denote by F p the field of p elements and always assume that it is represented by the first p-many non-negative integers {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over F p given by an affine Weierstrass equation, which for gcd( p, 6) = 1 takes the form
for some A, B ∈ F p with non-zero discriminant 4 A 3 + 27B 2 = 0. The F p -rational points E(F p ) of E form an Abelian group (with respect to the usual addition denoted by ⊕) with the point at infinity O as the neutral element. Let x(·) and y(·) be the coordinate functions, then for a point P ∈ E(F p ), P = O with affine components P = (x P , y P ) we have x(P) = x P and y(P) = y P .
For a given point G ∈ E(F p ) and initial point W 0 ∈ E(F p ) the elliptic curve congruential generator is the sequence (W n ) of points of E(F p ) satisfying the recurrence relation
We also define the elliptic curve congruential generator with respect to the first coordinate as the sequence (x n ) in F p as
The elliptic curve congruential generator has been widely studied, many positive results have been proven about its randomness, see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 8, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] 16 ] and see also the survey paper [15] . In particular, El Mahassni and Shparlinski [5] showed that (W n ), and so the sequence (x n ), is well-distributed. Hess and Shparlinski [8] , and Topuzoglu and Winterhof [16] provided lower bounds to the linear complexity profile of the sequence (x n ).
However, it is clear, that when the curve E is given, the sequence (W n ) is predictable from two consecutive points W n , W n+1 . In Gutierrez and Ibeas [7] , showed that when the prime p and G are known, then the sequence (W n ) is predictable even if just an approximation of W n , W n+1 are revealed (even if the curve E is private). These show that the security of the point sequence (W n ) is not well-established. However these attacks use the assumption that the prime and the curve (resp. the point G) are given which assumption is quite optimistic (in the viewpoint of the attacker).
In our cryptographic settings, all the parameters, as the initial point W 0 = (x 0 , y 0 ), the generator G = (x G , y G ), the parameters of the curve A, B and the prime p are assumed to be secret and just the output of the generator x 1 , x 2 , . . . represented as non-negative integers, are used. The main contribution of this paper is that if some consecutive elements are revealed, then one can compute in polynomial time (polynomial in log p) an elliptic curve congruential generator (where the curve possibly defined over the rational or over a residue ring) such that the generated sequence is identical to (x n ) in the revealed segment. It turns out that in practice, all the secret para-meters, and thus the whole sequence (x n ), can be computed from eight consecutive elements.
The result suggests that for cryptographic applications the elliptic curve congruential generator should be used with great care.
In Sect. 2 we summarize some basic facts about elliptic curves. In Sect. 3 we present the algorithm, and in Sect. 4 we discuss results of numerical tests.
Background
In this section we summarize some basic facts about elliptic curves. First we recall the definition of the group operation ⊕ of E defined over arbitrary field k. Then we extend the notion of elliptic curve to the case where it is defined over a ring.
The group law on the curve
Let k be a field of characteristic different from 2, 3. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over k given by an affine Weierstrass Eq. (1) with A, B ∈ k, 4A 3 + 27B 2 = 0. The group operation ⊕ in E is defined in the following way.
Definition 1
The operation ⊕ is defined over E as follows. If P = (x P , y P ) and
(iv) if P = Q and y P = 0, then P ⊕ Q = O.
Elliptic curves over Z m
If m is a composite integer with gcd(m, 6) = 1, elliptic curve E can be also defined over Z m via the projective Weierstrass equation
with A, B ∈ Z m , gcd(4 A 3 + 27B 2 , m) = 1. The Z m -rational points E(Z m ) of E with projective coordinates can be represented as a triple (x : y : z) such that gcd(m, x, y, z) = 1 (but not necessarily z = 0 or 1). As in the field case, group operation can be defined on E (see [10, 17] ) whose formulas correspond to Definition 1 if the divisor in (i) or (ii) is co-prime to m.
We remark that for integers m 1 , m 2 , gcd(m 1 , m 2 ) = 1 we have
as groups. Moreover, if E is an elliptic curve over Q defined by (1) with integers A, B, then for m with gcd(4
is a group homomorphism (where the representation (x : y : z) is chosen as x, y, z ∈ Z and gcd(x, y, z) = 1). Finally, for arbitrary integers m 1 , m 2 (not necessarily co-primes), the the map
is a group homomorphism.
Predicting the congruential generator on elliptic curve over rings
Suppose we are given an initial segment x 1 , . . . , x s of a sequence (x n ) generated by an elliptic curve generator as non-negative integers. We would like to predict the remainder part of this sequence and specially, to compute the parameters of the generator, namely, the prime p, the parameters of the curve A, B and the points G, W 0 .
If for two different generators with primes p and q, the revealed initial segments coincide, then the same initial segment is generated by an elliptic curve generator over Z p·q . Clearly, in this case only the generator over the ring Z p·q is computable (without assuming the easiness of the integer factorization problem) and to recover the private parameters further revealed elements are needed.
On the other hand, if the curve E is defined over Q with non-negative integers A, B and G, W 0 ∈ E(Q) are points such that x(i G ⊕ W 0 ) are all integers for i = 1, . . . , s, then there are infinitely many possible primes p (and generators) exist, namely all large enough primes are suitable.
Thus our aim is to determine the most general elliptic curve generator (possibly over Q or over a ring Z m ) which generates the same initial segment.
The following theorem shows that if at least seven initial values are revealed, then it can be computed a curve E over Q or over Z m with p | m and points G, W 0 such that these revealed values are the initial segment of a sequence generated by an elliptic curve generator with E, G and W 0 . If more values are revealed, then a better approximation can be given to the generator (i.e. to the prime p). 
We summarize the steps of computing in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Predicting the EC-LCG
Input: non-negative integers x 1 , . . . , x 7 generated by an elliptic curve congruential generator (3) Output: x, y 2 , A, B, m such that p | m, and if x n (n = 2, 3, . . .) generated by (5), then x n ≡ x n mod p whenever W n = O. 1: define the vectors c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 as the columns of the matrix C in (9) and u as (10) 2
write 
Remark 2
If we increase the number of revealed elements, then the algorithm can be extended which provides a better approximation m to p and hence a better approximation to (x n ), see Sect. 4. In practice, 8 elements contain enough information to learn the exact value of p.
Proof (Theorem 1) Let us assume, that the integers x 1 , . . . , x 7 generated by an elliptic curve congruential generator (3) are given.
By (3), we can write
where −G is the (additive) inverse of G:
. By the addition law, by the assumption that W i = ±G (i = 1, . . . , 6) and by (1) we have
in F p . Thus
i.e., (2x
Put
and Assuming Lemma 1, the matrix C has rank 4 over F p , and by (8) the congruence
has the solution e = (x G , x 2 G , A, B, y 2 G , x 3 G ) T . The algorithm looks for an integer m such that the congruence (11) has a solution e = (e 1 , . . . , e 6 ) T modulo m with the additional restriction e 2 1 ≡ e 2 mod m. During the algorithm we will always have p | m. If m takes a finite value, then we can suppose that gcd(m, 6) = 1, since p > 3. Moreover, a ≡ b mod m for m = 0, means that a = b as rationals.
Since the congruence (11) 
can be expressed as
If λ 2 1 ≡ λ 2 mod m, we have to replace m to gcd(m, λ 2 1 − λ 2 ). Next, consider the case when det (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , u) = 0 (over Q). Now, the equation C · e = u has solutions over Q. By Lemma 1, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 are linearly independent over F p and thus over Q. As before (14) with unique integers λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , λ 4 , μ. Moreover, every integer solution (λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , λ 4 , μ ) of (14) has the form γ · (λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , λ 4 , μ) with some γ ∈ Z.
If m = 0, write the solutions of (12) in the same form as (13) .
In both cases, if m = 0 write
is a solution of (12) . If
is an element such that
, the sequence ( x n ) generated by the elliptic curve congruence generator (with W 0 , G) satisfies (5) so x 1 , x 2 , . . . are in Z m and thus x i = x i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 7) as integers.
Finally, if m = 0, write
and the integer sequence x 1 . . . , x 7 is generated by G. The set of possible primes p are those ones which p μ and p > max{x i : i = 1, . . . , 7}. Finally, it is remain to prove Lemma 1.
Proof (Lemma 1) Clearly, it is enough to show that the vectors
are linearly independent over F p . Suppose to the contrary that there are
Substituting (6) to (15) we have
Clearing the denominator we get
has at least five zeros:
Write F(X ) into the following form
where
Since deg F ≤ 4, we must have that F(X ) is the zero polynomial. In this case we have
Then the coefficients of X and 1 in (16) are
By (17) and (α 1 , . . . , α 4 ) = (0, . . . , 0) we also have α 2 , α 4 = 0, thus
whence using (1) we get
, we get that x G is a multiple root of the right hand side of (1), which contradict that the discriminant of the curve is non-zero.
Numerical tests
I have implemented the algorithm of Theorem 1 in SAGE. The algorithm have been tested for 1000 random examples of generators with 500-bit primes p. For seven revealed sequence elements, the algorithm computed the exact values of the parameters ( p, A, B , G, W 0 ) in 95,2 % of the cases. In the remainder cases, the algorithm provided a composite integer m and parameters A, B, G, W 0 such that p | m and A ≡ A, B ≡ 
If the number of revealed sequence elements increases, then the algorithm can be modified to become more effective. Namely, if there are eight revealed sequence elements, then applying the algorithm for the first and the last seven elements, two
Modifying the SAGE program in this way, the algorithm was successful in 100 % of the cases.
Final remarks, open questions
In this paper we showed that the sequence x n = x(nG ⊕ W 0 ) (n = 1, 2, . . .) is highly predictable if at least seven consecutive elements are revealed. A natural question is whether one can reduce the number of revealed elements.
In the literature, the distribution and the linear complexity profile of the general sequence f (nG ⊕ W 0 ) with f ∈ F p (E) have been also studied (where F p (E) is the function field of E(F p )), see [1] [2] [3] [4] 8, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] . The predictability of these sequences could be handle for individual functions f , but it is not clear whether there is a universal algorithm for all function f (or at least all function f with small degree).
An other possible question connected to the result is how much information about x(nG ⊕ W 0 ) we really need to recover all the private parameters. Gutierrez and Ibeas [7] showed that when the prime p and G are known, then the sequence (W n ) is predictable even if just an approximation of W n , W n+1 are revealed. However, the problem is still open in the case when the prime is unknown. One can also consider this problem over arbitrary (not prime) finite fields. Namely, if the curve is defined over a finite field F p s with degree s > 1, then one can define an integer sequence as (x 1 (nG ⊕ W 0 ), . . . , x r (nG ⊕ W 0 )) n = 1, 2, . . . where r ≤ s and x 1 (P), . . . , x s (P) are the coordinates of x(P) with respect to a fixed basis of F p s over F p . Is it possible to recover the whole sequence from an initial segment, at least when the degree s is fixed? Clearly, the most interesting case when p = 2 and the generator builds a binary sequence.
